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ACCRUAL AND UNUSUAL? CALIBRATING THE STATUTE
OF LIMITATIONS ON SECTION 1983 METHOD-OFEXECUTION CHALLENGES
ABSTRACT
Death-row prisoners have long challenged the methods by which states
intend to execute them. Recently, prisoners have begun to challenge revisions
made by states to their execution procedures, arguing the revisions violate the
Eighth Amendment ban on cruel and unusual punishment. But reviewing
courts—almost without exception—bar these challenges on statute of
limitations grounds. Courts rule that the prisoner’s claim accrues shortly after
conviction and that the statute of limitations expires shortly thereafter, no
matter when the challenged revision was actually made. Method-of-execution
challenges are routinely dismissed in this fashion without full consideration of
their underlying constitutional merits. This result essentially grants immunity
to states and prevents meaningful challenge to revised execution procedures.
This Comment proposes that courts should adopt a broader and more
prisoner-friendly statute of limitations in the method-of-execution context. The
statute of limitations on method-of-execution claims should reset when a state
changes its execution procedure in any way that creates a cognizable claim of
cruel and unusual punishment or other constitutional violation. This change is
warranted in light of the gravity of the issues at stake and the need to
synchronize with related areas of law. It would better serve the purposes
motivating statutes of limitations; it would work hand in hand with the
equitable doctrine of laches; it would mirror tort law’s discovery rule; it would
align with courts’ interpretation of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act; and it would honor the Supreme Court’s “death is different”
jurisprudence. For all these reasons, this Comment argues that a broad,
flexible, and prisoner-friendly statute of limitations on method-of-execution
claims is appropriate and just.
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INTRODUCTION
Andrew Grant DeYoung was executed in Georgia on July 21, 2011.1
Executions in the State of Georgia occur regularly,2 and while an execution is
always noteworthy, DeYoung’s was particularly significant for two reasons.
First, DeYoung’s was only the second execution carried out under a revised
Georgia execution procedure using pentobarbital rather than sodium thiopental
as the first drug in the so-called three-drug cocktail.3 Second, his execution
was the only lethal injection ever videotaped, and the first videotaped
execution of any kind in the United States in nearly twenty years.4 While these
two reasons may seem distinct, they are inextricably linked.
The videotaping of DeYoung’s execution was ordered in connection with
an appeal by another Georgia death-row inmate, Gregory Walker.5 Walker
claimed, as part of his case in a Georgia superior court, that the State’s revised
execution procedure violated his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel
and unusual punishment.6 Georgia had recently changed its execution
procedure: it substituted pentobarbital for sodium thiopental as the first drug in
the three-drug cocktail.7 Walker claimed that pentobarbital, unlike sodium
thiopental, would not sufficiently anesthetize him.8 This type of challenge to a
revised execution procedure, known as a “method-of-execution” claim, is
increasingly common among death-row inmates.9
1 See Rhonda Cook, Georgia’s Death Row; Family Murderer DeYoung Executed, ATLANTA J. CONST.,
July 22, 2011, at 1B.
2 Georgia has executed more prisoners since 1976 than all but six states in the union. Facts About the
Death Penalty, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CENTER 1, 3 (Aug. 15, 2012), http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/
documents/FactSheet.pdf.
3 Cook, supra note 1.
4 See id. California’s execution of Robert Alton Harris by gas chamber in 1992 is considered the only
other videotaped execution. Videotape of a California Execution is Destroyed, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 1994, § 1,
at 35.
5 Cook, supra note 1.
6 Id.; Rhonda Cook & Bill Rankin, Court Allows Execution’s Taping, ATLANTA J. CONST., July 21,
2011, at 2B (describing Walker’s attorney’s argument that the previous execution of Roy Blankenship
subjected him “to unnecessary pain and suffering”). The Eighth Amendment protects individuals from the
infliction of cruel and unusual punishment. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
7 See Cook, supra note 1 (describing the recent change from sodium thiopental to pentobarbital).
8 Shannon McCaffrey, Judge OKs Video Recording of Execution; for Use by Inmate in Lethal-Injection
Suit; Georgia Man Put to Death for 1993 Slayings of Parents, Sister, CHARLESTON GAZETTE (W. Va.), July
22, 2011, at 3C.
9 See, e.g., Walker v. Epps, 550 F.3d 407 (5th Cir. 2008); McNair v. Allen, 515 F.3d 1168 (11th Cir.
2008); Cooey v. Strickland, 479 F.3d 412 (6th Cir. 2007). These challenges often claim the revised execution
procedure violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. E.g., Walker, 550
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The superior court ordered DeYoung’s execution to be taped so the judge
could watch DeYoung’s execution to determine whether the use of
pentobarbital caused “the sort of ‘objectively intolerable risk of harm’ that
qualifies as cruel and unusual”10 and is prohibited by the Eighth Amendment.11
One might assume that if the DeYoung tape showed affirmative evidence
of harm caused by the revised execution procedure, Walker’s Eighth
Amendment challenge would have been successful. However, this Comment
shows that under current law, challenges to revised execution procedures are
often unsuccessful notwithstanding their underlying merits.
This lack of success stems from numerous rulings that bar such challenges
on statute-of-limitations grounds.12 Courts have held that the limitations period
on method-of-execution claims accrues shortly after conviction,13 expires a
short time thereafter,14 and only resets if the state makes a substantial change
to its execution procedure.15 Importantly, courts have interpreted substantial
change very narrowly: only wholesale, transformative changes in the execution
procedure will reset the limitations period.16
Prisoners who seek to challenge a revised execution procedure are often
barred from doing so because courts find the challenged revision is not

F.3d at 409; McNair, 515 F.3d at 1171. However, some prisoners have claimed other constitutional violations,
including Fourteenth Amendment equal protection and due process. See, e.g., DeYoung v. Owens, 646 F.3d
1319, 1323 (11th Cir. 2011) (equal protection); Powell v. Thomas, 643 F.3d 1300, 1302 (11th Cir. 2011) (per
curiam) (due process), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 3018 (2011). This Comment does not take a position on the
underlying merits of these claims, under either amendment. For the purpose of clarity, this Comment generally
refers to Eighth Amendment cruel and unusual punishment challenges. It should be remembered, however, that
this Comment’s position applies to all method-of-execution challenges, whether brought under the Eighth,
Fourteenth, or any other Amendment.
10 Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 50 (2008) (plurality opinion) (announcing the Eighth Amendment cruel and
unusual standard in death penalty cases).
11 Id. at 50 (announcing the Eighth Amendment cruel and unusual standard in death penalty cases); Cook
& Rankin, supra note 6, at 2B.
12 See, e.g., McNair, 515 F.3d at 1174. See generally infra Part I.B (discussing rulings relating to accrual
dates).
13 The default rule, absent a change in the execution procedure, is that a method-of-execution claim
accrues after a prisoner’s state appeal (as opposed to federal habeas review) is completed. See McNair, 515
F.3d at 1174.
14 The statute of limitations on modern method-of-execution claims is two years. See infra note 35 and
accompanying text.
15 See McNair, 515 F.3d at 1174.
16 See, e.g., Powell v. Thomas, 643 F.3d 1300, 1304 (11th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (stating that change
from sodium thiopental to pentobarbital is not a substantial change), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 3018 (2011); see
also infra Part I.B.3.
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substantial.17 This finding leads to the conclusion that the limitations period
has run, sometimes even before the challenged revision occurred.18 This
procedural hurdle bars method-of-execution challenges without full
consideration of their underlying merits.19 This Comment takes issue with this
result and proposes a conceptual shift to avoid that unjust and seemingly
absurd outcome.
The proposed conceptual shift involves instituting a more flexible and
prisoner-friendly statute-of-limitations framework. Specifically, this Comment
argues that while the existing accrual framework outlined above—and
discussed in more detail below20—is appropriate, courts should expansively
define substantial change as any change that creates a cognizable claim of
cruel and unusual punishment or other constitutional violation.
This proposed framework would give prisoners a full and fair hearing on
the merits of their method-of-execution challenges and prevent states from
repeatedly defeating those challenges on procedural grounds alone. This result
is not only just and desirable, but also in line with reasoning from related areas
of law.21
This Comment’s three Parts each lend support to its proposal. Part I
presents a brief background of relevant principles and supporting caselaw,
including the statutes of limitations on method-of-execution claims and accrual
of those statutes of limitations. Part II examines the policies and principles
motivating statutes of limitations in general and asks whether the current
procedural framework governing method-of-execution claims properly serves
those policies. Ultimately concluding that it does not, Part II considers several
alternatives and concludes that only an expansive definition of substantial
change properly serves the policies and principles motivating statutes of
limitations. Part II also addresses a potential counterargument to this
Comment’s proposal—that relaxing the statute-of-limitations framework
would encourage frivolous, last-minute challenges by prisoners merely to
delay their execution. Part III draws from related areas of law to find support
for the proposal, including: the tort law concept of discoverability, also known
17

See, e.g., Powell, 643 F.3d at 1304.
See, e.g., id. at 1302 (holding the prisoner’s claim expired in July 2004, nearly seven years before the
state changed its execution procedure in April 2011).
19 See, e.g., id. (dismissing summarily the merits of the prisoner’s underlying Eighth Amendment
challenge).
20 See generally infra Part I.B (describing the § 1983 method-of-execution accrual date framework).
21 See generally infra Part III (discussing related areas of law).
18
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as the discovery rule; habeas law and the application of the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), a related federal statute; and the
Supreme Court’s “death is different” line of jurisprudence.
I. BACKGROUND
This Comment proposes that courts facing statute-of-limitations questions
in the method-of-execution context should broaden the definition of substantial
change. This would create a broad and prisoner-friendly conception of the
types of changes to an execution procedure that reset the limitations period on
method-of-execution claims. A brief discussion of relevant background
principles is necessary to set the stage for such a proposal.
Death-row prisoners have challenged their impending executions on Eighth
Amendment grounds for decades.22 These method-of-execution challenges
were traditionally brought as writs of habeas corpus.23 But with a pair of
cases—one in 200424 and one in 200625—the Supreme Court declared that 42
U.S.C. § 1983, not habeas corpus, was the proper vehicle for method-ofexecution challenges. Section 1983, passed as part of the Civil Rights Act of
1871, provides a private right of action against state actors who violate
constitutional rights, such as the Eighth Amendment prohibition on cruel and
unusual punishment.26 After the Supreme Court identified § 1983 as the only
proper vehicle for method-of-execution claims,27 the number of such claims
increased dramatically.28 In response, states raised their statutes of limitations
as a defense to such challenges, placing the issue squarely before courts across
the country.29 Section 1983 and its statute of limitations are described in Part
I.A.
22 See Deborah W. Denno, Getting to Death: Are Executions Constitutional?, 82 IOWA L. REV. 319, 333–
39 (1997) (recounting the early history of method-of-execution challenges).
23 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2006); see Ty Alper, Blind Dates: When Should the Statute of Limitations Begin to
Run on a Method-of-Execution Challenge?, 60 DUKE L.J. 865, 873 n.32 (2011) (citing Liam J. Montgomery,
Note, The Unrealized Promise of Section 1983 Method-of-Execution Challenges, 94 VA. L. REV. 1987, 1995–
96 (2008)).
24 Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637, 639–40 (2004).
25 Hill v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 573, 580–81 (2006).
26 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006). For an example of such a private right of action, see McNair v. Allen, 515
F.3d 1168 (11th Cir. 2008), which ruled on a prisoner’s method-of-execution challenge on Eighth Amendment
grounds.
27 See Hill, 547 U.S. at 580–81; Nelson, 541 U.S. at 639–40.
28 See Alper, supra note 23, at 873 n.30 (describing several academic articles discussing the increase).
29 See, e.g., McNair, 515 F.3d 1168; Cooey v. Strickland, 479 F.3d 412 (6th Cir. 2007); Alper, supra note
23, at 873 n.30 (collecting sources).
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Because the limitations period on all § 1983 claims has been a settled point
of law for over twenty-five years,30 the current issue that has emerged is the
accrual date—the date on which the limitations period begins to run. The
question of the proper accrual date is at the heart of this Comment, and the
body of law that has developed to answer that question in the § 1983 methodof-execution context is analyzed in Part I.B.
A. Section 1983 Generally & Its Statute of Limitations
Section 1983 does not contain a statute of limitations.31 As is the case with
many federal causes of action,32 when no statutory limitations period is
provided, courts adopt the statute of limitations from “‘the most analogous’”
state-law cause of action.33 Because the Supreme Court has declared that
personal injury actions are most analogous to § 1983, the personal injury
statute of limitations applies to every § 1983 claim.34 In most states, that statute
of limitations is two years.35 The statute of limitations on § 1983 claims is thus
relatively straightforward, but the question addressed by this Comment—the
proper accrual date—is a more difficult one to answer. That question is
discussed immediately below.
B. The Section 1983 Method-of-Execution Accrual Date Framework
The Supreme Court has ruled that while the § 1983 statute of limitations is
to be determined by examining state tort law for the recovery of damages for
personal injuries,36 “the accrual date of a § 1983 cause of action is a question
of federal law that is not resolved by reference to state law.”37 This question
was first answered obliquely by the Court in 2007: accrual occurs “when the
30 See Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 276 (1985) (holding the statute of limitations on § 1983 claims
mirrors the statute of limitations for state personal injury actions).
31 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
32 See, e.g., Wilson, 471 U.S. at 266.
33 Id. at 268 (quoting Bd. of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478, 488 (1980)). However, this applies only
to federal causes of action created before 1990. Federal causes of action created after 1990 are subject to 28
U.S.C. § 1658, which provides a four-year statute of limitations.
34 Id. at 276.
35 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 6-2-38(a) (2005) (two-year statute of limitations); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE
§ 335.1 (West 2006) (two-year statute of limitations); GA. CODE ANN. § 9-3-33 (2012) (two-year statute of
limitations); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.003 (West 2002) (two-year statute of limitations).
36 Wilson, 471 U.S. at 276.
37 Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 388 (2007) (first emphasis added). The Court reached this conclusion
in Wallace because the accrual date is an aspect of § 1983 that is not explicitly “governed by reference to state
law,” and such aspects are “governed by federal rules conforming in general to common-law tort principles.”
Id.
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[prisoner] has a complete and present cause of action, that is, when the
[prisoner] can file suit and obtain relief.”38
This answer is tautological. The accrual date is, by definition, the date on
which the prisoner can first bring suit; thus it is unhelpful to say accrual occurs
when the prisoner has a “complete and present cause of action.”39 It simply
begs the question: when does a prisoner have a complete and present cause of
action? In the usual § 1983 case—not a method-of-execution case, but one
involving, say, civil rights violations by police—the claim accrues when the
conduct that allegedly violates a constitutional right actually occurs.40 This is,
for instance, the moment the police conduct an illegal search,41 or the point at
which a government authority violates the plaintiff’s First Amendment free
speech rights.42
In the method-of-execution context, the moment at which the prisoner “has
a complete and present cause of action” 43 is a murky proposition. The body of
cases addressing this issue is shallow. Only a handful of courts have answered
the question, and they have done so in a mostly uniform manner.44 This line of
jurisprudence is discussed in the following three subsections.
1. Cooey v. Strickland: The First Word on Accrual
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals was the first circuit to seriously
address45 the accrual date issue in the § 1983 method-of-execution context.46
38

Id. (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
40 See, e.g., Johnson v. Johnson Cnty. Comm’n Bd., 925 F.2d 1299, 1301 (10th Cir. 1991) (“Claims
arising out of police actions toward a criminal suspect, such as arrest, interrogation, or search and seizure, are
presumed to have accrued when the actions actually occur.”); Spencer v. Connecticut, 560 F. Supp. 2d 153,
159 (D. Conn. 2008) (“[S]o long as the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the search, a [§ 1983] claim
for an illegal search accrues, and a plaintiff has a complete and present cause of action, when the act of
searching the property is complete.”).
41 See, e.g., Spencer, 560 F. Supp. 2d at 159 (“[A] claim for an illegal search accrues, and a plaintiff has a
complete and present cause of action, when the act of searching the property is complete.”).
42 See generally Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 504–05 (1969).
43 Wallace, 549 U.S. at 388 (internal quotation marks omitted).
44 Compare McNair v. Allen, 515 F.3d 1168 (11th Cir. 2008), with Powell v. Thomas, 643 F.3d 1300
(11th Cir. 2011) (per curiam), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 3018 (2011), and Cooey v. Strickland, 479 F.3d 412 (6th
Cir. 2007). Each case used the same two-prong test developed in McNair and discussed in detail in Part I.B.1–
3.
45 The Fifth Circuit faced the question a year earlier than the Sixth Circuit, but resolved it in a cursory,
four-paragraph per curiam opinion that did not analyze in detail the accrual date question. See Neville v.
Johnson, 440 F.3d 221 (5th Cir. 2006) (per curiam). The Neville court relied on another 2005 Fifth Circuit
opinion. See id. That case, White v. Johnson (also a per curiam decision and equally cursory), denied a death39
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The prisoner in the Sixth Circuit case, Richard Cooey, was sentenced to death
in 1986.47 His state appeal was exhausted in 1991 after review in the United
States Supreme Court.48 The State of Ohio instituted lethal injection as one
method of execution in 1993 and as the sole method of execution in 2001.49 In
December 2004, Cooey filed his § 1983 method-of-execution challenge.50 The
district court denied the State’s argument that Cooey’s § 1983 claim was timebarred, and the Sixth Circuit addressed that issue as an interlocutory appeal.51
The court reasoned from the basic principles described above: the statute of
limitations on a § 1983 action is determined with reference to state personal
injury law,52 but the proper accrual date is a question of federal law.53 The
accrual date is fixed when the prisoner “‘has [a] complete and present cause of
action.’”54 A “‘complete and present cause of action’”55 exists when the
prisoner “‘can file suit and obtain relief.’”56 This unhelpful definition simply
begs the question. The court finally moved toward a workable accrual date
framework: “‘the event that should have alerted the typical lay person to
protect his or her rights’” marks the moment when a § 1983 action accrues.57
The court recognized that, in general, a person should be alerted to protect his
rights at the “point when the actual harm is inflicted.”58 In the method-ofexecution context, this point would be the actual execution.59 The court refused

row inmate’s request for a permanent injunction without deciding the procedural question. 429 F.3d 572, 574
(5th Cir. 2005) (per curiam).
46 Cooey, 479 F.3d at 413–14. The history of the Cooey case is a tangled web of appeals, remands, and
rehearings between the Southern District of Ohio and the Sixth Circuit, plus certiorari petitions to and denials
from the Supreme Court. See id. at 414. This convoluted procedural history—not uncommon in § 1983
method-of-execution actions—is unimportant for the purposes of this Comment, so references in the text to
any case in the series will be simply to “Cooey.”
47 Id.
48 See id. Cooey’s federal habeas appeal was denied by the district court in 1997. Id. The United States
Supreme Court denied certiorari to review his habeas appeal in 2003. See id.
49 Id. at 416.
50 Id. at 414–15.
51 Id. at 415.
52 Id. at 416 (citing Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 275–76 (1985)).
53 Id. (citing Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 388 (2007)).
54 Id. (quoting Wallace, 549 U.S. at 388).
55 Id. (quoting Wallace, 549 U.S. at 388).
56 Id. (quoting Wallace, 549 U.S. at 388).
57 Id. (quoting Trzebuckowski v. City of Cleveland, 319 F.3d 853, 856 (6th Cir. 2003)).
58 Id. at 418.
59 Id.
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to set the date of execution as the accrual date because if the claim accrued
upon execution, “it would also be simultaneously moot[ed].”60
Having dispensed with the execution as a possible accrual date, the court
looked backward in time.61 The court formulated a rule that applies generally
to § 1983 method-of-execution claims: the claim accrues “upon conclusion of
direct review in the state court or the expiration of time for seeking such
review.”62 This rule was attractive to the court because it both “marks the point
at which the state has rendered its criminal judgment final and . . . the point at
which the state sets the execution date.”63
Of course, it would have been impossible for Cooey to challenge the lethal
injection procedure within two years of the conclusion of his state review.64
His conviction and sentence were finalized on state review in 1991, but lethal
injection was not used in Ohio until 1993 and did not become mandatory (i.e.,
certain to be applied to Cooey) until 2001.65 There must be some exception to
the above-announced rule when an execution method is applied to a prisoner
after his state review is complete. Indeed, the court announced such an
exception in Cooey, but failed to define it precisely. The accrual date must be
“adjusted” in a scenario where the plaintiff could not “discover[] the ‘injury’”
until after his state review was complete because a new execution procedure
was implemented after that time.66 The court declined to precisely define the
“adjusted” accrual date when there is a change in the execution procedure

60 Id. One commentator has argued there should be no statute of limitations on a § 1983 method-ofexecution challenge because the injury does not occur until the prisoner is executed. See Alper, supra note 23,
at 897. This proposal, while admirable because it necessarily affords capital litigants a hearing on the merits,
has at least one main problem. It overlooks the purpose motivating statutes of limitations: to provide repose to
defendants. See generally infra Part II.A (discussing general statute-of-limitations principles).
61 See Cooey, 479 F.3d at 418–19.
62 Id. at 422 (noting this accrual date framework “mirror[s] that found in the [Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act]”).
63 Id. at 419. Note the court’s deference to state judgments, which it justified as adherence to the
AEDPA: “The [AEDPA] reflects Congress’s desire to restore and maintain the proper balance between state
criminal adjudications and federal collateral proceedings,” such as § 1983 challenges. Id. at 420 (emphasis
added).
64 See id. at 422.
65 See id. at 416.
66 Id. at 422. The Cooey court’s aversion to deeming a claim accrued before the prisoner could have
“discovered” the injury giving rise to the claim evokes the discovery rule. See id. That rule, grounded in tort
law, provides additional support for this Comment’s position. See generally infra Part III.A (discussing tort
law’s discovery rule).
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because, whether it fixed the accrual date in 1993 or in 2001, Cooey’s claim,
brought in 2004, would have been beyond the two-year statute of limitations.67
Cooey thus acts as an early analytical stepping-stone to the current rule.
The default rule that it established—that § 1983 method-of-execution claims
accrue at the end of state review—is good law today.68 But later cases
addressing a changed execution procedure refine Cooey’s rule.69 The Cooey
court was not forced to address head-on the question of whether the limitations
period should reset upon a change in a state’s execution procedure. Even if the
Cooey court had reset the limitations period, Cooey’s claim would still have
been time-barred because the change occurred more than two years before he
brought his action.70 To fully grasp the current framework, we must look to
cases when a prisoner challenged a revised procedure within two years of the
revision.
2. McNair v. Allen: The Eleventh Circuit Follows Suit
The next major guidepost is McNair v. Allen, an Eleventh Circuit case
decided in 2008.71 In McNair, the prisoner, Callahan,72 was sentenced to death
in Alabama in 1987.73 His state appeal was exhausted in 1990.74 At the time of
Callahan’s conviction, Alabama used electrocution to execute its death-row
prisoners.75 In 2002, the State instituted lethal injection as its preferred method
of execution.76 On October 11, 2006, Callahan filed a § 1983 action requesting
a stay of execution and alleging the lethal injection procedure violated his
67

Cooey, 479 F.3d at 422.
See, e.g., id.
69 See, e.g., Powell v. Thomas, 643 F.3d 1300, 1303 (11th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (describing the rule
that a method-of-execution claim accrues on the date on which state review is complete, barring a subsequent
change in the execution procedure), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 3018 (2011).
70 See Cooey, 479 F.3d at 422.
71 515 F.3d 1168 (11th Cir. 2008).
72 The prisoner arguing before the Eleventh Circuit was James Callahan, whose § 1983 action was
consolidated at the district court level with an action brought by Willie McNair, a similarly situated prisoner
(hence the disparity between the active party and the case name). See McNair v. Allen, Nos. 2:06-cv-00695WKW, 2:06-cv-00919-WKW, 2007 WL 4106483, at *2 (M.D. Ala. Nov. 16, 2007).
73 Ex parte Callahan, 557 So. 2d 1311 (Ala. 1989). Callahan was first convicted in 1982, but that
conviction was reversed on an unrelated basis. See McNair, 515 F.3d at 1171. Callahan was retried,
reconvicted, and resentenced in 1987. See id. The capital sentence imposed in 1987 is the one at issue in
McNair. See id.
74 Callahan v. Alabama, 498 U.S. 881 (1990); see also McNair, 515 F.3d at 1171.
75 McNair, 515 F.3d at 1171.
76 Id. (explaining that on July 1, 2002, Alabama provided death-row inmates thirty days to “opt out” of
the new lethal injection procedure and elect to die by electrocution). Callahan did not opt out and so became
subject to the lethal injection method of execution as of July 31, 2002. Id.
68
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Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment.77 The
State, as defendant, moved for summary judgment, arguing that under Cooey,78
Callahan’s § 1983 claim was time-barred by the statute of limitations.79 The
district court denied the State’s motion for summary judgment by specifically
disavowing the Cooey court’s reasoning; the district court wrote that the statute
of limitations could not bar the claim because it “cannot attach to an act that
has yet to occur.”80 After entering summary judgment for the prisoner, the
district court also entered a stay of execution.81 The Eleventh Circuit vacated
the stay.82 It tracked the reasoning and holding of Cooey and held that the
statute of limitations had expired and that Callahan’s claim was barred.83
To reach this conclusion, the court examined four possible dates on which
the statute of limitations could accrue: (1) the date of actual execution;84 (2) the
date the prisoner’s federal habeas challenge was finally denied;85 (3) the date
the prisoner’s death sentence became final upon the completion of state
review;86 and (4) the date the execution method in question became applicable
to the prisoner.87
77

Id.; McNair, 2007 WL 4106483, at *2.
McNair, 2007 WL 4106483, at *4 (“[D]efendants relied on the reasoning of the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals in Cooey . . . .”).
79 See McNair, 515 F.3d at 1171.
80 McNair, 2007 WL 4106483, at *4. The court adopted this reasoning from an earlier Middle District of
Alabama opinion. See id. There, Judge Myron Thompson persuasively argued the statute of limitations should
not “bar injunctive relief from an injury that has not yet occurred.” Jones v. Allen, 483 F. Supp. 2d 1142, 1153
(M.D. Ala.), aff’d, 485 F.3d 635 (11th Cir. 2007).
81 McNair v. Allen, Nos. 2:06-cv-00695-WKW, 2:06-cv-00919-WKW, 2007 WL 4463489, at *1 (M.D.
Ala. Dec. 14, 2007), vacated, 515 F.3d 1168 (11th Cir. 2008).
82 McNair, 515 F.3d at 1178.
83 See id. at 1174. The procedural history of Callahan’s § 1983 challenge giving rise to the Eleventh
Circuit’s McNair opinion is—like Cooey and many other § 1983 death penalty challenges—quite convoluted.
The November 16, 2007 opinion from the Middle District of Alabama denied the State’s motion for summary
judgment based on the statute of limitations. McNair, 2007 WL 4106483, at *4. Shortly before that opinion
was filed, on October 31, 2007, the State set Callahan’s execution date for January 2008. See McNair, 515
F.3d at 1172. The setting of his execution date precipitated his filing of a motion for a stay of execution, which
was granted by the district court on December 14, 2007. McNair, 2007 WL 4463489, at *1. That decision—
granting the stay of execution—was appealed to the Eleventh Circuit and gave rise to the McNair opinion
discussed here, which established for the first time the two-prong § 1983 method-of-execution accrual
framework. McNair, 515 F.3d at 1174. This procedural history is inconsequential for the purposes of this
Comment, except to note that the Eleventh Circuit in McNair was reviewing a stay of execution by the district
court (granted December 14, 2007), but the district court’s analysis of the accrual issue—the dispositive
question—was actually articulated in a separate opinion (issued November 16, 2007).
84 McNair, 515 F.3d at 1174.
85 Id. at 1175.
86 Id. at 1176.
87 Id. at 1177.
78
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The court quickly dispensed with the first two options. It first determined
that, despite the district court’s reasoning, the date of execution was
unworkable as the point of accrual for two reasons.88 First, such a rule is
incompatible with the Supreme Court’s pronouncement in Wallace v. Kato that
“accrual under the statute of limitations ‘occurs when the [prisoner] has a
complete and present cause of action, that is, when the [prisoner] can file suit
and obtain relief.’”89 The McNair court explained that a prisoner may seek
relief long before he is executed,90 so accruing the action on the date of
execution is both incompatible with Wallace and practically problematic.91
Second, the court explained that § 1983 litigants in other contexts are allowed
to seek “prospective relief” when the complained-of action has yet to take
place.92 It would be anomalous to treat prisoners bringing method-of-execution
claims differently than all other § 1983 litigants by holding that method-ofexecution claims necessarily cannot accrue until the date of the actual injury
(i.e., execution).93
The court next eliminated the completion of federal habeas review from the
list of possible dates of accrual.94 The court reasoned that accruing the § 1983
claim only after federal habeas review would “fail to show proper respect for
principles of federalism,” because it would unduly delay states’ ability to
exercise their penal authority.95 The court looked to principles from the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA)96 to justify this
deference to federalism.97 Echoing Nelson v. Campbell, the court reasoned that
because “method-of-execution challenges brought under § 1983 . . . ‘fall at the
margins of habeas,’” they implicate the same “comity concerns” embodied in

88

Id. at 1174–75.
Id. at 1174 (quoting Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 388 (2007)).
90 The court explained that the general rule that plaintiffs cannot seek § 1983 relief until the injury occurs
is inapplicable in cases “where the ultimate injury is reasonably likely and wholly foreseeable.” Id.
91 Id. (citing Cooey v. Strickland, 479 F.3d 412, 418 (6th Cir. 2007)) (looking to Cooey for its discussion
of the “problems with selecting date of execution as date of accrual”).
92 Id. (explaining that § 1983 parole eligibility claims can be brought before the disputed parole hearing
takes place).
93 Id.
94 Id. at 1175.
95 Id. at 1175–76 (discussing the importance of the interests of both the State and the victims in the
“‘timely enforcement of [the] sentence’” (quoting Hill v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 573, 584 (2006))).
96 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2006).
97 See McNair, 515 F.3d at 1175 (explaining the court was “mindful of the [AEDPA], which Congress
passed ‘. . . to further the principles of comity, finality, and federalism’” (quoting Woodford v. Garceau, 538
U.S. 202, 206 (2003))).
89
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the AEDPA.98 These comity concerns counsel against setting the accrual date
for § 1983 method-of-execution claims after the completion of federal habeas
review because doing so “would provide capital [prisoners] with a means of
delaying execution even after their sentences have been found lawful by both
state and federal courts.”99
Having dismissed two of the four possible options, the court analyzed a
potential baseline rule: a capital prisoner’s § 1983 method-of-execution claim
accrues on the “day on which [his] death sentence becomes final following
direct [i.e., state] appeal.”100 In Callahan’s case, however, an exception to this
general rule should have applied.101 The method of execution Callahan
eventually challenged in McNair—lethal injection—was not applied to him
until twelve years after his state review was complete.102 The court wisely
understood that this baseline rule would have absurdly required Callahan to
challenge lethal injection a full ten years before it was instituted.
To make room for this circumstance, the court finally adopted the modern
hybrid rule that blended the remaining two options for the date of accrual.103
The rule has two prongs. A § 1983 method-of-execution claim accrues on the
later of: (1) “the date on which state review is complete,” or (2) “the date on
which the [prisoner] becomes subject to a new or substantially changed
execution [procedure].”104 This framework mirrors the Cooey court’s decision,
but it directly addresses the question the Cooey court avoided: what happens if
the state changes the execution procedure more than two years after the
prisoner’s state review is complete?105

98

Id. (quoting Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637, 646 (2004)).
Id.
100 Id. at 1176. The court identified three reasons for choosing this date as the general date of accrual: (1)
preventing premature claims brought before state review, which might eventually overturn the conviction; (2)
reaching a balance between giving § 1983 litigants a hearing on the merits and avoiding interference with state
penal objectives; and (3) establishing symmetry between § 1983 accrual and habeas accrual, which also occurs
once state review is final. See id. at 1176–77.
101 See id. at 1177 (holding the statute of limitations could not have accrued upon completion of state
review “because, at that time, Alabama had not yet adopted lethal injection as a form of execution”).
102 See id. (noting state review was completed in 1990 but lethal injection was not applicable to Callahan
until 2002).
103 See id. at 1174.
104 Id.
105 Compare id. (establishing accrual on the later of completion of state review or substantial change in
execution procedure), with Cooey v. Strickland, 479 F.3d 412, 422 (6th Cir. 2007) (holding that when there is
a change the accrual date must be adjusted beyond the end of state review, but declining to “pinpoint the
accrual date” because Cooey’s claim was late by either measure).
99
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Application of this rule to Callahan’s case is straightforward.106 His state
review was completed in 1990, but a new execution procedure was applied to
him in 2002.107 His § 1983 method-of-execution claim thus accrued on the
later date of 1990 or 2002.108 Because Callahan’s action was filed in 2006, four
years after the claim accrued, it was time-barred.109
Although application of this rule to Callahan’s case was simple, in other
cases application is more difficult. This difficulty is created by the vagueness
of the key phrase that makes up the second prong of the two-prong framework:
“new or substantially changed execution [procedure].”110 While a new
execution procedure should be easy to spot, what qualifies as a substantially
changed execution procedure? The McNair court declined to add meat to the
bones of this key phrase.111
Certainly the execution procedure as applied to Callahan was substantially
changed; he went from facing electrocution to facing lethal injection.112 The
change had no consequence in McNair because the suit was brought more than
two years after the change was made.113 But what about a closer case, when the
change in execution procedure faced by a prisoner is less dramatic? The court
in McNair provided no guidance as to how broadly or narrowly the “new or
substantially changed execution [procedure]” prong should be interpreted.114

106

See McNair, 515 F.3d at 1177.
Id. at 1171.
108 See id. at 1174, 1177.
109 Id. at 1177.
110 Id. at 1174.
111 See id. at 1177.
112 Id. at 1171. It is worth noting that the State of Alabama revised its lethal injection procedure on
October 26, 2007. Id. at 1172. Callahan argued that his claim was timely because it was brought less than two
years from that date. See id. The court dismissed out of hand this argument, noting without explanation that no
“significant change in the state’s execution [procedure] . . . occur[red] in this case.” See id. at 1177. Neither the
court of appeals opinion nor the two district court orders described the October 2007 change. See id. at 1172;
McNair v. Allen, Nos. 2:06-cv-00695-WKW, 2:06-cv-00919-WKW, 2007 WL 4463489, at *1 (M.D. Ala.
Dec. 14, 2007) (explaining only that “[o]n October 26, 2007, the defendants filed a revised lethal injection
[procedure]”); McNair v. Allen, Nos. 2:06-cv-00695-WKW, 2:06-cv-00919-WKW, 2007 WL 4106483, at *3
n.6 (M.D. Ala. Nov. 16, 2007) (noting without explication the “apparently minor nature of the change”). News
outlets reported that the change made by the State of Alabama to its execution procedure in October 2007 was
to add a “consciousness check” after administration of the first drug (the barbiturate) to ensure the prisoner is
unconscious before injection of the remaining drugs, which can otherwise cause extreme pain. Stan Diel,
State’s New Execution Procedure Detailed, BIRMINGHAM NEWS (Oct. 26, 2007, 6:48 AM), http://blog.al.com/
spotnews/2007/10/states_new_execution_procedure.html.
113 See supra text accompanying notes 106–09.
114 McNair, 515 F.3d at 1174.
107

LENNON GALLEYSPROOFS1

422

1/31/2013 11:57 AM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 62:407

We must look to cases following McNair to see how the Eleventh Circuit and
other courts have applied this rule, and how they might apply it more sensibly.
3. Powell v. Thomas: The Current Limited-Access Framework
Eddie Powell was sentenced to death in Alabama in 1998 and his state
appeal was exhausted in 2001.115 In Powell v. Thomas, he brought a § 1983
method-of-execution challenge to the State’s revised execution procedure.116
Approximately two months before Powell’s scheduled execution, the Alabama
Department of Corrections (ADOC) announced it would use pentobarbital as
the first drug in the three-drug lethal injection cocktail.117 Since 2002, when
the State switched its method of execution from electrocution to lethal
injection, it had used sodium thiopental—not pentobarbital—in each
execution.118 Powell alleged the State’s imminent use of pentobarbital in his
execution violated his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and
unusual punishment.119 His § 1983 method-of-execution action was brought in
the district court less than three weeks after ADOC changed its execution
procedure and just over one month before his scheduled execution.120
The Eleventh Circuit used the two-prong McNair test to determine that
Powell’s challenge was untimely.121 The court reasoned that the statute of
limitations accrued in 2002 when the method of execution was changed from
electrocution to lethal injection, expired two years later in 2004, and did not
reset when ADOC changed the drug used in the three-drug cocktail.122 The
court held that the State’s “replacement of sodium thiopental with
115

Powell v. Allen, 602 F.3d 1263, 1267 (11th Cir. 2010) (per curiam).
Powell v. Thomas, 643 F.3d 1300, 1302 (11th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 3018 (2011).
The Powell line of cases is convoluted. It includes four cases, two each from Alabama district courts and the
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals. See id. (dealing with prisoner Williams); Powell v. Thomas, 792 F. Supp.
2d 1285 (M.D. Ala.) (also dealing with prisoner Williams), aff’d, 643 F.3d 1300 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 131
S. Ct. 3018 (2011); Powell, 602 F.3d 1300 (dealing with prisoner Powell); Powell v. Allen, No. 7:06-cv00375-IPJ-HGD (N.D. Ala. Sept. 29, 2008) (also dealing with prisoner Powell). This twisted path is confused
further by the fact that in two of the cases a second prisoner, Williams, intervened in Powell’s case. The issues,
both at the trial and appellate levels, are nearly identical in both the Powell (Williams) and Powell (Powell)
lines of cases. In the interest of clarity, this Comment discusses only the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals
opinion that deals with prisoner Powell.
117 Powell, 643 F.3d at 1302.
118 Id.
119 Id. Powell also brought a Fourteenth Amendment challenge to the State’s revision of its execution
procedure. See id. at 1305.
120 Id. at 1302.
121 Id. at 1304; see also McNair v. Allen, 515 F.3d 1168, 1174 (11th Cir. 2008).
122 Powell, 643 F.3d at 1304.
116
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pentobarbital does not constitute a significant alteration” in the execution
procedure.123 According to the court, Powell’s ability to challenge the use of
pentobarbital in his execution expired in 2004, two years after the State made
lethal injection its method of execution.124 This firm statement obscures the
fact that the State did not announce its intention to use pentobarbital until
nearly seven years after Powell’s claim expired.125
The Powell case is a prime example of the problem identified by this
Comment. A state revises its execution procedure, and a death-row prisoner
seeks to challenge that revision.126 The reviewing court rules that his challenge
is untimely and that it would have been timely only if brought several years
before the revision was made.127 Courts have essentially made challenging a
change in an execution procedure impossible unless it rises to the level of
wholesale change (e.g., from electrocution to lethal injection).128 More
moderate changes are wholly insulated from judicial review.
Courts have in some cases addressed in cursory fashion the underlying
merits of a § 1983 method-of-execution claim even when it is procedurally
barred.129 Some might argue that this sort of analysis is sufficient and shows
courts are willing to consider the underlying merits of a claim brought beyond
the limitations period. But courts should allow the merits to be fully heard and
adjudged. The current procedural framework prevents even the most
meritorious claims from being heard if brought beyond the statute of
limitations, but for a court’s potential willingness to overlook the procedural
bar.130 Prisoners should not be at the mercy of a court’s willingness to bend or
break the rules to hear meritorious claims; the rules should be changed.

123 Id. (quoting Powell v. Thomas, 641 F.3d 1255, 1258 (11th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct.
2487 (2011)).
124 Id. at 1302.
125 Id. at 1302, 1304 (holding the prisoner’s claim accrued in July 2002 and thus expired in July 2004,
nearly seven years before ADOC publicly announced its substitution of pentobarbital for sodium thiopental in
April 2011).
126 Id. at 1301–02.
127 See id. at 1302, 1304.
128 See, e.g., id. at 1303–04 (holding the prisoner’s claim accrued when the State changed its execution
procedure from electrocution to lethal injection and declining to reset the limitations period after a change in
the lethal injection procedure).
129 See, e.g., Powell v. Thomas, 641 F.3d 1255, 1257 (11th Cir.) (per curiam) (“We are unable to
determine that the district court abused its discretion by crediting the expert report submitted by the State and
concluding that Williams has not demonstrated a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of this Eighth
Amendment claim.”), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 2487 (2011).
130 See, e.g., Alper, supra note 23, at 902–03.
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This Comment proposes a solution: expand the definition of substantial
change to include any change that may create a cognizable claim of cruel and
unusual punishment or other constitutional violation. Courts should, at the very
least, permit prisoners to present evidence showing a change is
unconstitutional and address the merits independently of the procedural
questions. A broader conception of what changes are substantial enough to
reset the limitations period is justified for several reasons, including fairness
and doctrinal consistency. The following Parts of this Comment draw from
various sources of law to support this Comment’s argument that the procedural
bar for § 1983 method-of-execution claims should be lowered.
II. THESIS & EXAMINATION OF STATUTE-OF-LIMITATIONS PRINCIPLES
Having discussed the necessary background information, this Part presents
in more detail this Comment’s proposal. Part II.A examines the general
principles and policies motivating statutes of limitations. After describing these
generalities, this section applies them to the § 1983 method-of-execution
context. This Comment argues that the current § 1983 method-of-execution
accrual framework does not serve the principles motivating statutes of
limitations. This Comment then examines whether any possible alternatives
would better serve statute-of-limitations principles. Ultimately, this Comment
concludes that a broad, prisoner-friendly accrual framework best serves the
principles and policies motivating statutes of limitations. Part II.B addresses a
potential counterargument to this conclusion.
A. General Statute-of-Limitations Principles
The general principles and policy considerations motivating statutes of
limitations provide guidance as to how statutes of limitations should operate in
the § 1983 method-of-execution context. By examining the ends served by
statutes of limitations in general, we can effectively judge whether the current
statute-of-limitations framework governing § 1983 method-of-execution
claims serves those ends and, if not, how an alternative framework might better
do so.
The overarching goals of statutes of limitations were described by the
United States Supreme Court in 1944: “to promote justice by preventing
surprises through the revival of claims that have been allowed to slumber until
evidence has been lost, memories have faded, and witnesses have
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disappeared.”131 Embedded in this description are two related but distinct
rationales.132 First, providing repose for litigants: “preventing surprise[]”
suggests that at some point parties should be relieved of worry that they may
be haled into court to account for some long-ago conduct.133 Second,
prohibiting litigation that requires the use of stale evidence: the Court lists
concerns about lost evidence, faded memories, and missing witnesses.134 The
countervailing principle is, of course, ensuring sufficient access to courts to
redress claims of injury. The proper statute-of-limitations framework will
strike a balance between these two principles: on the one hand, allowing fresh
claims to be heard without procedural bars and, on the other hand, ensuring
repose and avoiding litigation based on stale evidence. This section outlines
several possible statute-of-limitations frameworks and examines the balance
struck by each.
There are four possible statute-of-limitations frameworks that could be
imposed on § 1983 method-of-execution claims—the one that is in place today
and three plausible alternatives. First, the one that is in place today: a § 1983
method-of-execution action accrues on the later of (1) the date on which state
review is complete or (2) when the prisoner becomes subject to a substantially
changed execution procedure.135 In this framework the definition of
substantially changed is quite narrow136: a substantial change has been found
only when the entire execution procedure is changed (e.g., from electrocution
to lethal injection).137 This narrow reading does not serve either principle
motivating statutes of limitations.
131

Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Ry. Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342, 348–49 (1944).
This Comment limits its discussion of the principles and purposes behind statutes of limitations to
statutes limiting civil claims. Although § 1983 method-of-execution claims skirt the line between civil and
criminal claims because they are bound up with the enforcement of a criminal sanction, § 1983 is inherently a
civil cause of action. Furthermore, the rationales motivating statutes of limitations on criminal prosecutions are
quite different from the rationales behind civil statutes of limitations because they focus on societal welfare
and retribution rather than solely on the interests of the litigants. See, e.g., Yair Listokin, Efficient Time Bars:
A New Rationale for the Existence of Statutes of Limitations in Criminal Law, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 99, 99–100
(2002) (explaining that criminal statutes of limitations, unlike civil statutes of limitations, must “balance
society’s need to punish a criminal” with the criminal’s right to repose and concerns about stale evidence).
133 R.R. Telegraphers, 321 U.S. at 348.
134 Id. at 349.
135 See supra text accompanying note 104.
136 See generally supra Part I.B.2–3 (discussing courts’ interpretation of the substantial change
requirement).
137 See, e.g., Powell v. Thomas, 643 F.3d 1300, 1303–04 (11th Cir.) (per curiam) (holding the prisoner’s
claim accrued when the State changed its execution procedure from electrocution to lethal injection and
declining to reset the limitations period after a change in the lethal injection procedure), cert. denied, 131 S.
Ct. 3018 (2011).
132
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Consider the Powell case discussed above.138 Just two months before
Powell’s execution, the State of Alabama changed a drug it would use in his
execution.139 Powell brought his challenge within three weeks of the
announced change.140 Because the change was made so close to the execution
date, and since Powell’s challenge was made shortly after the change, none of
the primary problems that statutes of limitations are meant to address were
present.141 There was no risk that Powell’s suit, arising from conduct
undertaken only three weeks before its filing, would “surprise” the State.142
Moreover, there was no risk that within three weeks evidence would have been
lost, memories would have faded, or witnesses would have disappeared.143
Hence, the current statute-of-limitations framework is too stringent; it bars the
courthouse door in an effort to ensure repose and prevent reliance on stale
evidence when neither of those concerns is implicated.
There are three possible alternatives to the current statute-of-limitations
framework. First, the statute of limitations on § 1983 method-of-execution
claims could be eliminated entirely.144 Second, § 1983 method-of-execution
claims could be given a longer limitations period than other § 1983 claims.
Third, the framework that is in use today could remain, but with an expanded
definition of the sort of substantial change that resets the limitations period.
Each of these three alternatives is discussed below. This Comment concludes
that only the last alternative strikes the appropriate balance between ensuring
access for method-of-execution claims on the one hand, and providing repose
to defendants and preventing litigation based on stale evidence on the other.
The first alternative—eliminating the statute of limitations on § 1983
method-of-execution claims—neglects both interests that statutes of limitations
are meant to serve.145 If prisoners could bring method-of-execution claims
many years after a revision to a state’s execution procedure, both interests
protected by statutes of limitations would be implicated: State defendants

138
139
140
141
142
143
144
145

See supra Part I.B.3.
See supra text accompanying note 120.
See supra text accompanying note 120.
See supra text accompanying notes 132–34.
See supra text accompanying note 133.
See supra text accompanying note 134.
See Alper, supra note 23, at 869–70.
See supra text accompanying notes 132–34.
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could be surprised by long-delayed suits and the ensuing litigation would likely
rely on stale evidence.146
The second alternative—lengthening the limitations period for method-ofexecution claims beyond the normal period for § 1983 claims—better serves
the prisoner’s interest in access to the courts by expanding the period in which
the prisoner can seek relief, but it is arbitrary and lacks any concrete
justification.147 Lengthening the limitations period on method-of-execution
claims alone is unworkable because doing so would contradict the Supreme
Court’s ruling affirmatively tying the § 1983 limitations period to the state’s
personal injury limitations period.148 Further, arbitrarily extending the period
for method-of-execution claims runs the risk of trampling states’ right to
eventually be in repose.
Finally, the alternative proposed by this Comment: a § 1983 method-ofexecution claim should accrue on the later of two dates: (1) when the
prisoner’s state review is complete; or (2) when the state substantially changes
the execution procedure to which the prisoner is subject in a way that creates a
cognizable claim of cruel and unusual punishment or other constitutional
violation.
While the first prong of this framework is identical to the rule announced in
McNair,149 this Comment argues that courts should expand the second prong
by adopting a broad definition of substantial change. A substantial change
should not be limited to only those changes that are significant in light of the
entire execution procedure (e.g., switching from electrocution to lethal
injection). The substantial change prong should also encompass any change
that creates a cognizable claim of cruel and unusual punishment or other
constitutional violation. Defining substantial change with reference to the
effect of the change on the prisoner—whether the change has the potential to
inflict cruel and unusual punishment, for example—is preferable to the current
formulation, which defines substantial change with reference to the size of the
146 The doctrine of laches may permit reviewing courts to throw out dilatory § 1983 method-of-execution
claims on equitable grounds. See generally infra Part II.B (discussing in depth the doctrine of laches). But
efficiency considerations counsel for at least some definite statute of limitations. States should be able to order
their affairs with the knowledge that method-of-execution claims will be absolutely barred after some definite
period.
147 So far as this Comment’s author can tell, no courts or academic commentators have proposed an
arbitrary lengthening of method-of-execution claims beyond the statute of limitations used for other § 1983
actions. For a lengthier discussion of this alternative, see infra Part III.C.
148 See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
149 McNair v. Allen, 515 F.3d 1168, 1174 (11th Cir. 2008); see also supra Part I.B.2.
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change in comparison with the overall execution procedure.150 That is, a
substantial change should be one that arguably creates a claim of cruel and
unusual punishment or other constitutional violation, regardless of whether the
change transforms the overall execution procedure.
This framework strikes the appropriate balance between protecting the
interests of the prisoner—by ensuring access to the courts to bring legitimate
constitutional claims—and protecting the interests of the state—by preventing
“surprise[]” and barring litigation that relies on stale evidence.151 Maintaining
the McNair two-part framework but expanding the definition of substantial
change is the best way to serve the rationales behind statutes of limitations
while ensuring full and proper access to redress in the courts for § 1983
method-of-execution prisoners.
B. The Laches Backstop
Opponents of this Comment’s position may argue that expanding the
definition of substantial change would allow death-row prisoners to bring
frivolous suits on the eve of execution for the sole purpose of delaying
enforcement of the state’s judgment.152 This argument may be appealing on its
face, but it overlooks a core principle of § 1983 law: laches.
The doctrine of laches allows courts to exercise their equitable power to bar
claims brought after an unreasonable delay.153 In the § 1983 method-ofexecution context, a court reviewing a § 1983 claim can dismiss the case
notwithstanding any statute of limitations if the prisoner has not exercised due
diligence in bringing his claim and if the delay prejudices the opposing
party.154
150 See, e.g., Powell v. Thomas, 643 F.3d 1300, 1304 (11th Cir.) (per curiam) (finding a change from
electrocution to lethal injection reset the limitations period but a change in the drugs used in the lethal injection
procedure did not), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 3018 (2011).
151 See Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Ry. Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342, 348–49 (1944).
152 Because the family of cases barring § 1983 method-of-execution claims on statute-of-limitations
grounds is relatively new, no such argument has been made by academic commentators or death penalty
litigants. However, there is language in the Supreme Court’s foundational opinions that sets the groundwork
for such an argument. See Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637, 649–50 (2004) (“[B]efore granting a stay [of
execution], a district court must consider . . . the extent to which the inmate has delayed unnecessarily in
bringing the claim.”); see also Hill v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 573, 584–85 (2006) (quoting Nelson and noting
that courts dismiss requests for stays of execution that are dilatory to “protect States”).
153 See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 953 (9th ed. 2009).
154 See 3 SHELDON H. NAHMOD, CIVIL RIGHTS & CIVIL LIBERTIES LITIGATION: THE LAW OF SECTION
1983, § 9:36 (4th ed. 2011); see also Grayson v. Allen, 499 F. Supp. 2d 1228, 1236 (M.D. Ala.) (explaining
that the party seeking dismissal on laches grounds must make three showings: (1) the opposing party delayed
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Both district and circuit courts reviewing § 1983 method-of-execution
challenges have invoked the doctrine of laches to dismiss dilatory claims.155
One court explained that when a death-row prisoner purposefully delays filing
a § 1983 method-of-execution claim until execution is imminent, dismissal of
the claim on laches grounds is appropriate.156 Such dilatory claims should be
dismissed because they unduly prejudice the state in two ways: (1) by “not
leav[ing] sufficient time for full adjudication on the merits”; and (2) by
interfering with the state’s strong interest in enforcing criminal judgments,
especially once all appeals have been exhausted.157
The doctrine of laches thus provides an equitable backstop that allows
reviewing courts to dismiss dilatory § 1983 method-of-execution claims. If the
proposal of this Comment is adopted and the statute of limitations is expanded
to allow greater access for prisoners bringing § 1983 claims, courts would still
have the authority to invoke laches to dismiss dilatory claims that are brought
only to delay execution. Recognizing the availability of laches should allay the
concerns of those who might suggest that expanding the statute of limitations
would provide death penalty prisoners with a method to unjustifiably delay
enforcement of the state’s judgment.158
III. LESSONS TO BE LEARNED FROM RELATED AREAS OF LAW
Part III looks to related areas of law to support the central claim of this
Comment: that an expansive definition of substantial change best serves the
varied interests implicated in § 1983 method-of-execution litigation. This Part
examines analogous principles from tort law, and in particular its discovery

in bringing his claim; (2) the delay was unjustified; and (3) the delay caused undue prejudice to the defendant),
aff’d, 491 F.3d 1318 (11th Cir. 2007).
155 See, e.g., Williams v. Allen, 496 F.3d 1210, 1215 (11th Cir. 2007); Hallford v. Allen, 634 F. Supp. 2d
1267, 1275–76 (S.D. Ala. 2007), aff’d, 576 F.3d 1221 (11th Cir. 2009).
156 Grayson v. Allen, 491 F.3d 1318, 1326 (11th Cir. 2007).
157 Id. at 1325–26 (approving of the district court’s reasoning in dismissing the case on laches grounds).
158 The average time between sentencing and execution has increased significantly in the past thirty years
and represents a significant delay in the states’ ability to effectively mete out punishments. See TRACY L.
SNELL, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, 2009—STATISTICAL TABLES 14 tbl.12 (2010) (noting
that the average time between sentencing and execution in 2009 was 169 months). The concern for expediting
enforcement of states’ judgments has animated discussions on this topic in the courts and in the legislature.
See, e.g., Hill v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 573, 584 (2006) (“Both the State and the victims of crime have an
important interest in the timely enforcement of a sentence.” (citing Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U.S. 538, 556
(1998))); Woodford v. Garceau, 538 U.S. 202, 206 (2003) (noting that Congress’s purpose in enacting the
AEDPA was “to reduce delays in the execution of state and federal criminal sentences, particularly in capital
cases”).
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rule; courts’ interpretation of the AEDPA, a related federal statute; and the
Supreme Court’s “death is different” jurisprudence. Each of these related areas
of law lends support to this Comment’s position that the § 1983 method-ofexecution accrual framework should be expanded.
A. Tort Law’s Discovery Rule
Tort law provides fertile ground from which to draw comparisons with
§ 1983 because it is fundamentally a “species of tort liability.”159 Because the
statute establishes a cause of action in tort, it is natural to examine tort
principles when answering questions about the proper application of § 1983.160
There is a background principle of tort law that supports this Comment’s
position: discoverability, or the “discovery rule” as it is sometimes called.161
The “overriding discovery rule principle” is straightforward: the rule delays
accrual of a tort claim until “a person of reasonable diligence discovers or
should have discovered facts that would show she has a reasonable claim, or
facts that would lead a reasonable person to investigate further.”162 The
discovery rule applies to federal and state torts. For example, the Supreme
Court has held that a Federal Tort Claims Act claim cannot accrue until “a
plaintiff is aware of his injury and its cause.”163 No § 1983 method-ofexecution case has directly discussed the discovery rule, but traces of the rule
can be seen in courts’ general formulations of the § 1983 method-of-execution
accrual framework described above.164

159 Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 483 (1994) (quoting Memphis Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477
U.S. 299, 305 (1986)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
160 Id.
161 See generally 1 DAN B. DOBBS ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS § 243, at 877–84 (2d ed. 2011) (discussing
the discovery rule). Because tort law is overwhelmingly state law—with certain federal exceptions such as
§ 1983—the nuances of the discovery rule can and do vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. See id. (discussing
various permutations of the discovery rule). In some states, the limitations period begins to run as soon as the
plaintiff knows the fact of his injury and its cause; in others, it will not run until he “discover[s] . . . facts
suggesting the defendant’s fault.” Id. at 879. The Supreme Court adopted the former rule in Federal Tort
Claims Act cases. See infra note 163.
162 DOBBS ET AL., supra note 161, at 878 (citing to state supreme court decisions articulating this rule).
163 United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 121 (1979). The Kubrick majority announced a fine distinction
between a plaintiff’s ignorance as to the very fact of his injury and its cause on the one hand and ignorance as
to the perpetrator’s legal culpability for the injury on the other. In the former case, the claim does not accrue;
in the latter, it does. Id. at 119–22; see also DOBBS ET AL., supra note 161, at 877–84 (discussing various
permutations of the discovery rule).
164 Part I.B describes courts’ general formulations of the § 1983 method-of-execution accrual framework.
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For example, in Cooey the prisoner challenged the State’s revision of its
execution procedure from electrocution to lethal injection.165 The State made
the revision ten years after Cooey’s state review was completed.166 Normally,
Cooey’s claim would have accrued upon completion of his state review and
expired two years later.167 This would mean his claim to challenge the revision
expired eight years before the challenged revision was actually made.168 The
court reset accrual, reasoning that Cooey “could not have discovered” his
claim until the challenged revision was actually made.169 The language used by
the Cooey court in crafting this exception evoked the discovery rule.170
Puzzlingly, the Cooey court cited an earlier opinion from the same circuit that
discussed the discovery rule, but the citation played little role in the opinion
and was merely a side discussion explaining the purpose of statutes of
limitations in general.171
The Eleventh Circuit in McNair formulated a rule that § 1983 method-ofexecution claims accrue on the later of two dates: the completion of state
review or the date when the prisoner becomes subject to a “new or
substantially changed” execution procedure.172 The court reached this rule by
applying a broad principle to the case before it, and that broad principle was a
species of the discovery rule.173 The court reasoned that a § 1983 action should
accrue when “facts which would support a cause of action are apparent or
should be apparent to a person with a reasonably prudent regard for his
rights.”174

165 Cooey v. Strickland, 479 F.3d 412, 416 (6th Cir. 2007). For a detailed discussion of Cooey, see supra
Part I.B.1.
166 Cooey, 479 F.3d at 416.
167 See id. at 418.
168 See id.
169 Id. at 422 (emphasis added).
170 See id.; supra note 66 and accompanying text.
171 Cooey, 479 F.3d at 419. The court cited an earlier Sixth Circuit case, with a parenthetical explaining
that the earlier opinion “not[ed] that the discovery rule ‘has been applied to prevent unjust results when a
plaintiff would otherwise be denied a reasonable opportunity to bring suit due to the latent nature of the injury
or the inability to discover the causal connection between the injury and the defendant’s action.’” Id. (quoting
John Hancock Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Old Kent Bank, 346 F.3d 727, 734 (6th Cir. 2003)). This is a fine description
of the discovery rule’s purpose; unfortunately, the rule never again appeared in the opinion except tangentially.
See supra text accompanying note 169.
172 McNair v. Allen, 515 F.3d 1168, 1174 (11th Cir. 2008).
173 Id. at 1173.
174 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). This is similar to the dictionary definition of the discovery rule:
“a limitations period does not begin to run until the plaintiff discovers (or reasonably should have discovered)
the injury giving rise to the claim.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 533 (9th ed. 2009).

LENNON GALLEYSPROOFS1

432

1/31/2013 11:57 AM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 62:407

As the foregoing examples show, courts presiding over § 1983 method-ofexecution cases are not ignorant of the discovery rule. They may not explicitly
invoke it when answering the accrual date question in the § 1983 method-ofexecution context, but they appear to be aware of the rule, at least as an
informative background principle. For instance, the Cooey court explicitly
defined the rule and seemed to adhere to it by rejecting accrual when the
defendant “could not have discovered” his injury.175 The McNair court
reasoned from the predicate that a § 1983 claim cannot accrue until the
prisoner has knowledge (actual or constructive) of the facts supporting his
action.176
Despite courts’ general acknowledgement of the discovery rule, they do not
vigorously apply the rule in § 1983 method-of-execution cases. In recent years,
for example, states have changed their execution procedures by substituting
one drug for another, and prisoners have sued under § 1983, claiming the
substitute drug will cause unnecessary pain and suffering.177 Courts facing
these claims have repeatedly disqualified them on statute of limitations
grounds, reasoning that substituting one drug for another is not the type of
substantial change that resets the limitations period.178
This conclusion seems in direct opposition to the discovery rule. If a
prisoner’s alleged injury is caused by the use of a new drug in his impending
execution, the prisoner cannot possibly discover the facts of that injury until
the change is implemented or at least announced. The discovery rule, if it is to
have any force, must be applied in this situation and reset the limitations
period. The Cooey court properly described the purpose of the discovery rule:
it “prevent[s] unjust results when a [prisoner] would otherwise be denied a
reasonable opportunity to bring suit due to . . . [his] inability to discover the
causal connection between [his] injury and the [State’s] action.”179 It is
difficult to imagine a greater injustice than forcing a prisoner to bring an action
before the events giving rise to that action have occurred. Indeed, the Cooey
court reset the limitations period when the State changed its execution method

175

Cooey, 479 F.3d at 422.
See McNair, 515 F.3d at 1173.
177 See, e.g., supra Part I.B.3 (discussing Powell v. Thomas, in which Alabama changed a drug in its
three-drug cocktail); see also DeYoung v. Owens, 646 F.3d 1319 (11th Cir. 2011).
178 See, e.g., DeYoung, 646 F.3d 1319; Powell v. Thomas, 643 F.3d 1300 (11th Cir.) (per curiam), cert.
denied, 131 S. Ct. 3018 (2011).
179 Cooey, 479 F.3d at 419 (quoting John Hancock Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Old Kent Bank, 346 F.3d 727, 734
(6th Cir. 2003)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
176
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from electrocution to lethal injection.180 It reasoned that the prisoner could not
have brought a method-of-execution claim until the change was made.181 That
scenario is nearly identical to recent cases where prisoners have brought suit
after a change in the drug that will be used to execute them and courts have
refused to reset the limitations period.182
Courts addressing the substitute drug cases have refused to reset the
limitations period because they do not consider substituting one drug for
another a substantial change akin to switching from electrocution to lethal
injection.183 These courts reason that changing one drug is not sufficiently
substantial in the scheme of an execution procedure to reset the limitations
period.184 But this is the wrong question. Instead of asking whether a change is
substantial in relation to the overall execution procedure, courts should conduct
a full hearing to determine whether a change is substantial enough to give the
prisoner a fresh claim of cruel and unusual punishment or other constitutional
violation.
In the electrocution-to-lethal-injection cases, courts have concluded that a
prisoner may have a claim that lethal injection violates his constitutional rights,
and he could not have discovered such a claim before lethal injection was
instituted.185 The result is a resetting of the limitations period and an
opportunity for the prisoner to bring his claim.186 The same answer should be
reached when a state changes the particulars of its method of execution,
including substituting a new drug: a prisoner could not reasonably be expected
to discover that claim before the change is implemented or at least announced.
The limitations period should be reset on discovery grounds, but courts thus far
have resisted reaching that conclusion.187
B. Flexible Application of the AEDPA’s Statute of Limitations
Method-of-execution challenges were once brought almost exclusively as
writs of habeas corpus.188 This approach was countenanced by Supreme Court

180
181
182
183
184
185
186
187
188

Id. at 422.
Id.
See, e.g., DeYoung, 646 F.3d 1319; Powell, 643 F.3d 1300.
See, e.g., Powell, 643 F.3d at 1304–05.
See, e.g., DeYoung, 646 F.3d at 1325; Powell, 643 F.3d at 1304–05.
See, e.g., Cooey, 479 F.3d at 422.
See, e.g., id.
See, e.g., DeYoung, 646 F.3d at 1325; Powell, 643 F.3d at 1303.
See 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2006); Alper, supra note 23.
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and courts of appeals rulings mandating such challenges be brought via
habeas.189 A consequence of shoehorning method-of-execution challenges into
the habeas framework was to subject them to the strictures of the AEDPA after
its passage in 1996.190 Although this Comment addresses the current state of
the law, which mandates that method-of-execution challenges be brought as
§ 1983 actions,191 a brief explanation of habeas corpus principles and the
influence of the AEDPA is necessary because courts still borrow from habeas
and the AEDPA when analyzing § 1983 method-of-execution claims.192 Courts
justify doing so because habeas actions—which are governed by the
AEDPA—are similar to § 1983 method-of-execution claims.193 After a brief
explanation, this section similarly looks to principles motivating passage of the
AEDPA and courts’ interpretations of the AEDPA to support this Comment’s
proposal.194
Most importantly, the AEDPA imposed for the first time a statute of
limitations on prisoners’ petitions for writs of habeas corpus.195 A lengthy
189

See In re Sapp, 118 F.3d 460, 462 (6th Cir. 1997) (“[T]his challenge to the manner of execution is a
challenge seeking to interfere with the sentence itself, and thus, is properly construed as a petition for habeas
corpus.”), abrogated by Cooey, 479 F.3d 412; see also Fugate v. Dep’t of Corr., 301 F.3d 1287, 1288 (11th
Cir. 2002) (per curiam) (declaring that a method-of-execution challenge brought as a § 1983 action was
improper because such a challenge “constitutes the functional equivalent of a . . . habeas petition” (internal
quotation marks omitted)); cf. Gomez v. U.S. Dist. Court, 503 U.S. 653, 653 (1992) (per curiam) (bringing a
§ 1983 method-of-execution challenge was an “obvious attempt to avoid the application of” the rule barring
successive habeas claims).
190 See Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
191 The Supreme Court declared with a pair of cases (one in 2004 and one in 2006) that § 1983—and not
habeas—is the proper vehicle for method-of-execution challenges. See Hill v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 573, 579
(2006); Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637, 639 (2004).
192 See, e.g., McNair v. Allen, 515 F.3d 1168, 1175 (11th Cir. 2008); Cooey, 479 F.3d at 421–22.
193 See infra note 199.
194 At least one scholar has argued that § 1983 method-of-execution claims are so different from habeas
actions that using AEDPA principles as guideposts for crafting § 1983 method-of-execution procedures is
improper. See Alper, supra note 23, at 886–87. Professor Alper argued that because habeas actions invalidate
the underlying sentence whereas § 1983 method-of-execution actions challenge only the procedure by which
the sentence is to be carried out, the two doctrines are fundamentally different. Id. at 891. While this
distinction is a valid one, Professor Alper’s argument rests on a marginalization of the core premise of the
AEDPA. The AEDPA was enacted “‘to reduce delays in the execution of state and federal criminal sentences,
particularly in capital cases.’” McNair, 515 F.3d at 1175 (quoting Woodford v. Garceau, 538 U.S. 202, 206
(2003)). Fundamentally, like habeas challenges, successful § 1983 method-of-execution challenges delay the
execution of capital sentences. Because the AEDPA was enacted to reduce such delays, it is appropriate to
look to the AEDPA for guidance on questions about § 1983. Both actions ultimately create the same realworld result: delay of capital sentences. The fact that one’s legal premise is different from the other should not
cloud this commonsense reality.
195 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act §§ 101, 105 (imposing a one-year statute of
limitations); see also Stephen B. Bright, Lecture, Is Fairness Irrelevant?: The Evisceration of Federal Habeas
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examination of the “concerns articulated” in the AEDPA, including detailed
analysis of its text and legislative history, is beyond the scope of this
Comment.196 It suffices to say that one lawmaker described the “‘root cause’”
behind the AEDPA as “‘problems of delay and abuse’” caused by federal
review of state sentences.197 This legislative history supports the Supreme
Court’s articulation of the broad purpose motivating passage of the AEDPA:
“reduc[ing] delays in the execution of state and federal criminal sentences,
particularly in capital cases.”198 The imposition of a statute of limitations on
habeas claims effectuated this purpose.
Although method-of-execution claims are now brought as § 1983 actions—
a statute to which the AEDPA does not apply—courts have considered the
AEDPA a guidepost when defining the procedural aspects of § 1983 methodof-execution claims.199 The Eleventh Circuit wrote in McNair that it was
“mindful” of the purpose motivating passage of the AEDPA in formulating
statute of limitations rules for § 1983 method-of-execution claims.200 The
McNair court hewed to the purpose of the AEDPA by deciding the default
accrual date for § 1983 method-of-execution claims should be completion of
state review, rather than completion of federal habeas review or any other later
date.201

Corpus Review and Limits on the Ability of State Courts to Protect Fundamental Rights, 54 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 1, 4 (1997) (“For the first time in the nation’s history, [the AEDPA] has imposed a statute of limitations
on petitions for habeas corpus relief.”). The AEDPA also includes a “modified res judicata rule” prohibiting
successive habeas corpus petitions except in very limited circumstances. Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 664
(1996).
196 Cooey, 479 F.3d at 421 (noting that the concerns articulated in the AEDPA apply in method-ofexecution cases).
197 See Larry W. Yackle, A Primer on the New Habeas Corpus Statute, 44 BUFF. L. REV. 381, 400 (1996)
(quoting 141 CONG. REC. 15,051 (1995) (statement of Sen. Trent Lott)).
198 Woodford, 538 U.S. at 206.
199 See, e.g., McNair, 515 F.3d at 1175 (“Although method-of-execution challenges brought under § 1983
are not governed by AEDPA, they . . . implicate many of the same comity concerns AEDPA was designed to
address.”). Courts’ inclination to adopt AEDPA principles in the § 1983 context is derived from language in
the Supreme Court’s opinion in Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637, 646–47 (2004). The Court in that case
definitively ruled that method-of-execution claims are properly brought via § 1983, but held that such actions
“fall at the margins of habeas.” Id. at 646. The Sixth Circuit adopted this comparison in Cooey v. Strickland.
479 F.3d at 421 (explaining that because § 1983 method-of-execution challenges fall “at the margins of
habeas,” the “concerns articulated . . . by Congress in the AEDPA” apply “with equal force” in § 1983
method-of-execution cases as they would in pure habeas cases (internal quotation marks omitted)).
200 McNair, 515 F.3d at 1175.
201 Id. (“These concerns counsel away from setting the moment of accrual at the end of federal habeas
review, since doing so would provide capital defendants with a means of delaying execution even after their
sentences have been found lawful by both state and federal courts.”).
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The limitations framework courts have formulated for § 1983 method-ofexecution claims—accrual on the later date of completion of state review or a
substantial change in the execution procedure—strikes a balance similar to the
one created by the AEDPA in habeas proceedings. On the one hand, prisoners
are permitted a timely challenge, but on the other hand, dilatory filings are
barred. But the devil is in the details. This Comment shows the § 1983
balancing is weighted heavily in favor of barring claims and against permitting
timely challenges.202 This imbalance is created by the narrow definition of
substantial change that courts have used to prevent many prisoners from
bringing Eighth Amendment claims via § 1983.203
Courts have used their equitable authority to prevent this type of imbalance
in AEDPA cases. The Supreme Court has liberally construed the AEDPA’s
statute of limitations, carving jurisprudential exceptions when fairness
demands a bending of the limitations period.204 The Court has explicitly
written that the AEDPA “does not set forth ‘an inflexible rule requiring
dismissal whenever’ its [statute of limitations] ‘clock has run.’”205
This Comment proposes that a similar adjustment of the statute-oflimitations period should apply to § 1983 method-of-execution claims when
fairness demands it. Take, for example, the Powell case discussed above.206 No
matter the merit of Powell’s underlying claim, the fact that the state action
Powell challenged occurred nearly seven years after his claim expired shows
the fundamental unfairness of a strict, state-friendly statute of limitations on
§ 1983 method-of-execution claims.207 Simple fairness demands that courts
should not deem a prisoner’s claim expired long before he could possibly bring
it. Courts should adopt in the § 1983 method-of-execution context the same
general flexibility they use in construing the AEDPA.208

202

See generally supra Part I.B.2–3 (discussing two method-of-execution cases).
See generally supra Part I.B.2–3 (discussing courts’ interpretation of the substantial change
requirement).
204 See, e.g., Holland v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2549, 2560 (2010) (holding that the AEDPA “is subject to
equitable tolling in appropriate cases”).
205 Id. (quoting Day v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 198, 208 (2006)).
206 See generally supra Part I.B.3 (Powell case).
207 See supra text accompanying note 125.
208 See Holland, 130 S. Ct. at 2560 (citing Day, 547 U.S. at 208).
203
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C. The Supreme Court’s “Death is Different” Jurisprudence
Finally, this section supports this Comment’s position by examining a
common theme present in many of the Supreme Court’s modern capital
punishment cases. This section briefly describes the Court’s “death is
different” jurisprudence209 and argues that the death-is-different rationale is
uniquely relevant in the § 1983 method-of-execution context.
The Court has often used a pithy rationale to inform its holdings in capital
cases: “death is different.”210 Reasoning that execution is a singular penalty,211
the Court has imposed both substantive and procedural protections that are
unique to the capital punishment context. Substantively, the Court has held that
the Eighth Amendment permits capital punishment only for a narrow segment
of especially heinous crimes and especially culpable offenders.212
Procedurally, the Court mandates what one commentator has dubbed “super
due process”213: an array of procedural hurdles imposed at the trial and
appellate levels in an attempt to ensure a fair outcome.214 There are several
procedural safeguards used only in capital cases: bifurcation into distinct guilt
and sentencing phases;215 sentencing by a jury—not a judge—only after

209

See generally infra note 215 and accompanying text.
See Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2046 (2010) (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens wrote
that as of 1984 “every Member of this Court has written or joined at least one opinion endorsing the
proposition that because of its severity and irrevocability, the death penalty is qualitatively different from any
other punishment.” Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 468 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). Consensus on the point has evaporated with the changing composition of the Court since
1984. Justice Scalia has affirmatively denied the death-is-different reasoning: “[D]eath-is-different
jurisprudence. . . . find[s] no support in the text or history of the Eighth Amendment . . . .” Atkins v. Virginia,
536 U.S. 304, 337 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting). The dissolution of the death-is-different consensus is not the
subject of this Comment, but it is worth noting the fractured state of this once unanimous proposition.
211 See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 306 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring) (noting the death penalty
“differs from all other forms of criminal punishment, not in degree but in kind”).
212 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 568 (2005). The Court has variously held that the death penalty
cannot be imposed in the following circumstances: where the crime committed is rape, Coker v. Georgia, 433
U.S. 584, 600 (1977); where the crime committed is felony murder and the defendant did not possess a
culpable mens rea, Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 797 (1982); where the defendant is under the age of
sixteen, Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 838 (1988) (plurality opinion); and where the defendant is
mentally retarded, Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321.
213 Margaret Jane Radin, Cruel Punishment and Respect for Persons: Super Due Process for Death, 53 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1143, 1143 (1980).
214 See, e.g., Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 614 (2002) (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment) (“This
Court has held that the Eighth Amendment requires States to apply special procedural safeguards when they
seek the death penalty.”).
215 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 195 (1976) (plurality opinion).
210
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consideration of aggravating and mitigating factors;216 presentation of all
mitigating factors by the defendant;217 and provision of appellate review of all
cases in which the death penalty is imposed.218
The Court has justified imposing these extra substantive and procedural
burdens by reasoning in each instance that “death is different.”219 Death is
different because death is the most severe form of punishment in the criminal
justice system.220 It differs qualitatively from all other forms of punishment, so
prisoners facing death deserve more substantive and procedural protections.221
If we take the Court’s reasoning seriously, we must apply it across the
spectrum of capital litigation, including in § 1983 claims.
There are a number of safeguards that could be applied in § 1983 methodof-execution cases, but the one at the heart of this Comment is an expansion of
the statute of limitations on § 1983 claims when the prisoner faces death at the
hands of the State. All § 1983 actions are subject to a personal injury statute of
limitations, which is generally two years.222 As discussed above, § 1983
method-of-execution cases are often dismissed on statute-of-limitations
grounds because courts fix the accrual date far in advance of the time when a
prisoner could actually bring his claim.223 If death truly is different, as the
Court suggests,224 and acknowledgement of this difference requires granting
procedural leeway to capital litigants, the statute of limitations on § 1983
method-of-execution claims should be more prisoner-friendly than in other
§ 1983 actions.
216 Ring, 536 U.S. at 609; Gregg, 428 U.S. at 193–95. In many jurisdictions an additional layer of
procedural protection exists in capital cases because the jury’s sentencing finding is only a recommendation to
the judge, which he may disregard under certain circumstances. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-5-47 (2006); FLA.
STAT. § 921.141 (2012).
217 See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 606–08 (1978) (plurality opinion).
218 Gregg, 428 U.S. at 195.
219 Ring, 536 U.S. at 605–06 (“[T]here is no doubt that ‘[d]eath is different.’” (second alteration in
original)); Lockett, 438 U.S. at 604 (“‘[T]he penalty of death is qualitatively different’ from any other
sentence.” (quoting Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976))); Gregg, 428 U.S. at 188 (“[T]he
penalty of death is different in kind from any other punishment imposed under our system of criminal
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As discussed in Part II.A, there are three ways the statute of limitations in
§ 1983 method-of-execution cases could be changed to adhere to the death-isdifferent principle: (1) eliminating the statute of limitations; (2) lengthening
the statute of limitations beyond the usual § 1983 period of two years; or (3)
fixing the accrual date more flexibly in the way suggested above: by expanding
the definition of the type of substantial change in an execution procedure that
resets the limitations period.225
The third way is most desirable and most in line with the principles
discussed herein. This Comment thus proposes an expansion of the definition
of substantial change so the limitations period resets when a state changes its
execution procedure in any way that creates a cognizable claim of cruel and
unusual punishment or other constitutional violation.
CONCLUSION
This Comment argues the current accrual date and statute-of-limitations
framework governing § 1983 method-of-execution claims is unfair,
unworkable, and untenable. The current framework places an unnecessarily
high procedural burden on method-of-execution claims. It prevents full
adjudication of such claims on their merits and dismisses too many on
procedural grounds alone. It does not strike a balance that properly serves the
interests that statutes of limitations are meant to protect.
The current framework is also out of step with related areas of the law. It
unreasonably asks prisoners to bring their claims before they could possibly
discover the injury they are challenging—an impossible task and one
inconsistent with the discovery rule. It works unbendingly to prevent many
prisoners from bringing method-of-execution claims even where fairness
demands a full hearing on the merits—inconsistent with how courts have
liberally and flexibly construed the AEDPA’s statute of limitations.226 And it
treats method-of-execution challenges in which prisoners challenge the most
severe punishment the state can impose like all other civil rights claims—
inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s death-is-different jurisprudence.227
In light of these problems with the current accrual and statute-of-limitations
framework, this Comment proposes a solution: expand the accrual framework
225
226
227

See supra Part II.A.
See supra text accompanying notes 203–04.
See generally supra Part III.C (discussing the Supreme Court’s death-is-different jurisprudence).
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to allow prisoners to bring challenges after states revise their execution
procedures. This Comment’s solution would not require a wholesale
reimagining of the statute-of-limitations framework. On the contrary, the twoprong standard defined in McNair is entirely appropriate.228 This Comment
merely argues that the scope of the second prong should be broadened. Courts
should expand their definition of substantial change to include all changes that
create a cognizable claim of cruel and unusual punishment or other
constitutional violation.
This Comment does admittedly propose a standard that is somewhat vague
and lacks concrete delineation. But this proposed definition of substantial
change is no more vague or indistinct than the wholly unstated definition
courts have used thus far. Moreover, courts—not academic commentators—are
in the best position to mold and craft a workable standard based on the
overarching themes of this Comment. This Comment simply proposes that the
definition be expanded so as to permit adjudication on the merits. How exactly
the definition should expand is a question best suited for the courts, which
regularly address the factual nuances of these cases.
Ultimately, the current framework is in need of serious revision. It lacks
principled, reasoned support and is responsible for barring the courthouse door
to far too many prisoners. It is time to open that door.
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